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Recent Developments 
County of Sacramento v. Lewis: 
A Suspect's Substantive Due Process Right is Not Violated when Police Action, 
Aimed at Apprehending a Suspected Offender, with No Intent to Harm or Legally 
Worsen Suspect's Situation, Causes Death 
The Supreme Court of the United States ruled that a 
police officer who is engaged in a high-
speed pursuit of a suspected offender 
does not violate a suspect's substantive 
due process right by causing death 
through deliberate indifference or 
reckless indifference to life. County 
0/ Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 
833 (1998). In so holding, the Court 
determined that the proper standard 
necessary to establish a Due Process 
violation is deliberate indifference that 
shocks the conscience. 
While responding to an 
unrelated call, officers James Smith 
("Smith") and Murray Stapp 
("Stapp") observed a motorcycle 
driven by Brian Willard ("Willard") 
with Philip Lewis ("Lewis") as a 
passenger, traveling at a high rate of 
speed. County 0/ Sacramento v. 
Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1988). Stapp 
yelled for the motorcycle to stop, 
turned on his police lights, and a chase 
ensued. Id In an effort to pin in the 
motorcycle, Stapp maneuvered his 
patrol car closer to Smith's patrol car. 
Id However, Willard sped away, 
managing to steer his motorcycle clear 
of the two police cars. Id The chase 
ended when Willard's motorcycle 
tipped over while attempting to turn 
left. Id Smith immediately applied 
his brakes, but his patrol car skidded 
into Lewis at forty miles an hour, 
propelling Lewis seventy feet down 
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the road. Id Lewis suffered massive 
injuries and was pronounced dead at 
the scene. Id Willard survived 
without serious injury. Id 
The respondents, Philip Lewis's 
parents and the representatives of his 
estate, brought suit against the 
petitioners, Sacramento County, the 
Sacramento County Sheriff's 
Department and Smith, alleging a 
deprivation of Lewis's Fourteenth 
Amendment substantive due process 
right to life. Id The district court 
granted summary judgment for Smith, 
reasoning that even if Smith violated 
Lewis's constitutional rights, Smith 
was entitled to qualified immunity. 
The Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit reversed the district 
court's decision and held that "the 
appropriate degree of fault to be 
applied to high-speed police pursuits 
is deliberate indifference to or reckless 
disregard for, a person's right to life 
and personal security." ld (quoting 
Lewis v. County a/Sacramento, 98 
F.3d 434, 441 (1996)). The ninth 
circuit reasoned that because Smith 
disregarded the Sacramento County 
Sheriff s Department's General Order 
on police pursuits, there was a genuine 
issue of material fact that could 
establish that Smith acted with 
deliberate indifference. Id The ninth 
circuit, therefore, remanded the case 
for a new trial. 
The Supreme Court of the 
United States granted certiorari to 
resolve the conflict among the circuits 
concerning the degree of culpability 
required by a police officer to violate 
substantive due process in a high-
speed chase. Specifically, the Court 
was faced with deciding whether the 
appropriate standard to be applied 
is deliberate or reckless indifference 
to life or conduct that rises to one that 
shocks the conscience. Id (citing 
Lewis v. County a/Sacramento, 98 
F.3dat441 (9thCir. 1996); Evans 
v. Avery, 100 F.3d 1033, 1038 
(C.A1 1996)). Before discussing 
which standards to apply, however, 
the Court addressed the County's 
contention that the Respondents suit 
was barred by a more definite 
provision of the constitution, 
precluding the application of a 
substantive due process claim The 
County relied upon Graham v. 
Conner, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), 
which held that "[ w ]here a particular 
amendment provides an explicit 
textual source of constitutional 
protection against a particular sort of 
Government behavior, that 
amendment, not the more generalized 
notion of substantive due process, 
must be the guide for analyzing 
claims." The county argued that 
Smith's actions constituted a seizure 
and, therefore, the case should be 
analyzed under the Fourth 
Amendment. The Court, however, 
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held that the Fourth Amendment 
covers searches and seizures and a 
motorcycle chase in pursuit of a 
suspect does not constitute a seizure 
under the Fourth Amendment. Id. 
(citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 395). 
The Court concluded that there was 
no Fourth Amendment violation, and 
that Smith's actions would be 
examined under a substantive due 
process violation analysis. 
Having determined that a 
substantive due process analysis was 
applicable, the Court turned to the 
issue of culpability necessary for a 
violation. The Court stated that when 
dealing with abusive executive action, 
only the "most egregious official 
conduct can be said to be arbitrary in 
the constitutional sense." Id. at 1716 
(quoting Collins v. Harker Heights, 
503 U.S. 115, 129, 112 S.Ct. 1061, 
1071 (1992». Under the Collins test, 
substantive due process can only be 
violated by executive action that 
shocks the conscience. Id. at 1717. 
The Court, relying on the Collins test, 
determined that Smith did not violate 
Lewis's substantive due process when 
he was killed during the vehicle chase. 
Id. at 1720. When looking at the 
government's actions, a totality of the 
circumstances standard should be 
used before judging actions that shock 
the conscience. Id. at 1718. The 
Court determined that in a situation 
of a high-speed pursuit of a suspect, 
an officer's instant judgment is 
required. Id. at 1720. With no time 
to think, an officer's actions must be 
held to the higher standard of the 
Collins test and not to the level of 
deliberate indifference or reckless 
indifference. 
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In the wake of the Court's 
holding, police officers will violate a 
suspect's due process rights in a high-
speed pursuit only if the officer's 
actions are arbitrary and shock the 
conscience. No longer will conduct 
that is deliberate or shows reckless 
indifference be enough to hold police 
officers liable for injuries sustained by 
suspects during pursuits. 
